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I. Introduction
The Republic of Turkey’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa, in general,
and Somalia, in particular, marks one of the most exciting and widely
misunderstood geopolitical and strategic events of the twenty-first century. Turkey is now considered a resident power in the Horn of Africa
and the Red Sea region. By resident power, we mean states that do not
possess territory outside a particular region, but nonetheless must be
taken into consideration in terms of that region’s security and politics.
Turkey, a state that geographically straddles Europe and the Middle
East, possesses no territory in the Horn of Africa but nonetheless is a
relevant state actor vis-à-vis the Horn’s politics and security. In short, the
actions Turkey takes in Somalia have a direct impact on the region.
From its humble beginnings as a humanitarian relief actor in 2011,
Turkey has become a political and economic heavyweight in the region,
with trade topping $650 million with Ethiopia, flights operating daily
from Istanbul to Djibouti, Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, and Turkish
officers training the largest contingent of Somalia’s armed forces in
Mogadishu.1 Its largest foreign embassy in the world is in Somalia’s
capital, Mogadishu, and Turkish companies operate Somalia’s most
critical and lucrative infrastructure: Mogadishu’s international airport
and port. The Turks have built hospitals, paved roads and thousands
of Somalis are educated in Turkey each year. A marvelous tactility
surrounds Turkey’s actions in Somalia. This separates it from other
external states that have participated in high-profile (and high profit)
ventures in Somalia for years with little to nothing to show for it.2
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Turkey’s presence is welcomed by many in the Horn—its president
(and former prime minister), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is so popular that
many Somali baby boys are named after him; girls are named Istanbul.
While Ethiopia has been the quiet epicenter of Turkish investment, and
Sudan has been integral to Turkish diplomacy in Africa, it is in Somalia
that Turkey has made the biggest international splash. This has generated fears about Turkey’s power projection to the region. The rulers
of some Arab Gulf states see a neo-Ottoman grand strategy at work
in Ankara’s attempts to restore an Ottoman port town in Sudan and
Turkish control of critical dual-use infrastructure in Somalia. Accordingly, they have taken measures to rollback what they see as undue
Turkish influence in their backyard.3 In the Horn itself, however, Turkey’s image remains generally positive.4
Given its precipitous rise as an important factor in the region’s
political economy, many scholars have attempted to explain Turkey’s
sudden interests and actions in the region and, more particularly,
Somalia.5 What is clear is that Turkey’s humanitarian impulses were
quickly superseded by economic motivations.6 These, in turn, were
complemented with an increasingly robust Turkish political presence
in Mogadishu. In fact, writing about Turkey in Somalia really means
writing about Turkey in the capital.7 This is entirely in line with nearly
all external state actors operating in Somalia, but it also means the
peripheries of this vast country are frequently ignored. As such, little
attention has been paid to Turkey’s actions outside Mogadishu, in the
country’s federal states and autonomous or independent regions.8
To fill this gap, the article offers a (re)appraisal of Turkey’s engagement with Somalia from the vantage point of the Republic of Somaliland, a de facto independent, but de jure internationally unrecognized
political entity. Using a qualitative methodology supported by interviews and observations from Somaliland, the author critically reassesses Turkey’s posture, actions and interests, contextualizing them
with Somaliland’s core national interests. The findings demonstrate
that Turkey is negatively perceived in Somaliland on account of
Ankara’s “One Somalia” policy, its training and arming of the Somali
National Army (SNA) and its ongoing support of Mogadishu’s political elite who wish to see a return to the pre-civil war Somali Union.
Thus, both the underpinnings and combination of Turkey’s actions,
while certainly not directed against Somaliland per se, have the poten122
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tial to negatively affect Somaliland’s national interests, cherished independence and sovereignty of action.
II. Somaliland: From Voluntary Union to Independence
Somaliland occupies a strategic location at the southern entrance to
the Red Sea (see Map 1). It has been de facto independent from the
Somali Union since 1991, but remains internationally unrecognized,
and is claimed by Somalia’s government. Mogadishu believes it has
strong claims to Somaliland, and the international community of states
tacitly agrees. It is Somalia, not Somaliland, that occupies seats at the
United Nation (UN) and the African Union (AU); Mogadishu hosts
international embassies, Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, does not (with
limited exceptions). This, despite the fact that Somaliland—previously
British Somaliland, a British Protectorate for over three-quarters of a
century—achieved its first independence on June 26, 1960, and was
duly recognized by 35 states and the UN (see Map 2).9 Nevertheless,
caught up in the wave of Somali nationalism sweeping across the
region, the newly independent Somaliland opted to enter a voluntary
union with what was formerly Italian Somalia, an Italian colony and,
subsequently. an Italian Trust Territory.10 On July 1, 1960, the two states
formed the Somali Republic or Somalia.
Figure 1: The Republic of Somaliland. Source: By Petercorless This vector image includes elements that have been taken or
adapted from this file: Us-attack-in-somalia-01082007-2134.svg
(by Petercorless~commonswiki)., CC BY 2.5, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=105638490

123

Bildhaan  Vol. 21

Figure 2: Colonial British Somaliland and Italian Somalia map
(in Italian). Source: By MacMoreno at Italian Wikipedia, CC
BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=65233852

The promise of the union quickly faded as Somalilanders found
themselves sidelined from key political posts in the union’s new capital, Mogadishu, by their more numerous cousins who were, after all,
on their home turf. Just one year after its promulgation, Somalilanders
voted against the Union Constitution and, in December 1961, military units revolted in Hargeisa in a failed bid to restore Somaliland’s
independence. The union’s initial attempts at democracy, already
seeing the first signs of rot by 1961, were binned in 1969 when the
army’s commander, Mohamed Siad Barre, led a successful coup d’etat.
Somalia became a “top-down developmental dictatorship” where Siad
elevated his own Darod clan and consolidated his power.11 Somalia
experimented with Marxism and curried favor with the Soviet Union,
fielding one of the largest and best-equipped armies on the continent,
only to cozy-up to the United States just prior to Barre’s disastrous
invasion of Ethiopia.12 The Ogaden War sowed the seeds for an eventual Somali civil war (actually, multiple wars), the results of which
continue to reverberate. The death knell of the Somali Republic finally

124

Brendon J. Cannon

came in 1991, the same year Somaliland declared its exit from the
union and reestablished its independent statehood.13
III. Turkey in Somalia: Undercutting Somaliland’s Viability
In 2011, when Turkey’s then prime minister, Erdoğan, visited Mogadishu, the Republic of Somaliland was already two decades old.
Given the intransigence of the Somaliland issue, and the instability
its undecided status brings to the Horn region, the ingress of a new
and hands-on external state such as Turkey offered the opportunity to
shake things up. Indeed, the humanitarian nature of Turkey’s initial
foray into Somalia looked benign, even promising to Somalilanders.
Turkey’s economic, political and military power as well as its Ottoman
history in Somaliland made it a desirable partner.14 Yet Mogadishu is
the locus of Turkey’s energy and outreach, not Somaliland. Despite
this, Somalilanders visit Turkey for medical treatment or for higher
education. As such, if Turkey’s actions in Somalia are removed from
the equation, its reputation holds up quite well in Somaliland.
Ten years on, its reputation in Somaliland is in tatters. Somaliland’s
unique legal and political limbo have conspired to translate Turkey’s
support of the Somali government into a zero-sum game, one where
the accrual of more power by the Somali state—the political elite comprising successive Federal Governments of Somalia (FGS)—equals a
corresponding decrease in power for Somaliland. In this reductionist scenario, Somalia’s political leaders will eventually amass enough
force to exercise a monopoly on violence over the length and breadth
of the historical Somali Union. That Somaliland considers itself legally
and politically separate—based on current and historical precedence—
is immaterial to Mogadishu’s leaders; to them, Somaliland forms an
integral part of Somalia. This situation turns the ostensibly well-meaning policies of Turkey and other external states—and, by extension,
their official support for “One Somalia”—into a loaded gun aimed
directly at Somaliland.15
Given their history, Somalilanders understandably pay great attention to and cherish their sovereignty and territorial integrity. These,
along with international recognition for Somaliland’s independence,
form their core national interests. Somaliland fulfills the criteria for
legal independent statehood as understood by both the AU and the
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UN. Its independence therefore sets no new legal precedents. Yet
its successes—its democratically elected government prints its own
money, issues passports and monopolizes the legitimate use of force
across the majority of its territory—performed over the course of three
decades with little to no outside assistance, have not resulted in its
official recognition.16 This fact, one for which successive Somaliland
governments bear partial blame, only adds insult to injury for the three
generations of Somalilanders who have grown up outside the broken union .17 Bashir Goth, Head of the Somaliland Mission in the US,
stated: “when you’re fighting for recognition [of Somaliland’s independence], everything else becomes secondary.” Somalilanders largely
agree, and 97 percent supported their independence from the Somalia
Union in a 2001 referendum.18
Because Somaliland’s primary national interest have everything to
do with its de facto independent status and the maintenance thereof,
Turkey’s actions in Mogadishu have arguably done more than any
other external state to empower Somalia’s government and military.
By way of explanation, a state’s primary national interests revolve
around territory, sovereignty and security. As such, primary security
threats generally emanate from a state’s near abroad. States also have
secondary and tertiary national interests that are less concrete and thus
prone to change. These can include various objectives of foreign policy
such as increased influence and prestige.19 It is safe to say that Turkey’s primary national interests have nothing to do with Somalia and
Somaliland. Turkey’s actions in Somalia form part of its secondary or
tertiary interests. Somaliland’s primary national interests, on the other
hand, are severely threatened by Turkey’s actions in Somalia.
This raises the stakes exponentially for Somaliland and offers a
great deal of explanatory power when it comes to the exasperation
expressed by Somalilanders about Turkey. As such, Turkey’s empowerment of the FGS and the SNA—very much in line with the primary
national interests of Somalia and directly threatening those of Somaliland—has the potential, more than any other development over the
past three decades, to snuff out Somaliland’s independence. This is
therefore a highly emotive issue, one that Dr. M. Nasir Ali, Director of
the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Hargeisa, voiced when he stated: “Turkey is seen as an actor that is not
impartial when it comes to Somalia-Somaliland issues. We see Turkey
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as an actor which is not neutral but one that backs Mogadishu’s rulers.” Ali opined, “Why do we see millions of dollars going to Somalia
[from Turkey]?... Turkey is a state that is allying with Somaliland’s
counterpart [Somalia] that is adversarial.”
For his part, Suleiman Elmi, a management consultant for Somaliland’s Ministry of Finance, opined Turkey’s “One Somalia” policy was
informed by its own national interests, namely its domestic political
problems associated with the Kurdish issue. According to Elmi, Turkey’s “Kurdish problem” meant that Ankara shrunk away from any
talk of separatism. He argued, however, that the background of Turkey’s conflict and the ongoing political issues bedeviling Somalia-Somaliland are “totally different,” because Somaliland was a separate
entity—as a British Protectorate, and subsequently an independent
state—prior to voluntarily forming a union with the Italian Trust Territory of Southern Somalia. Elmi’s reference to the ongoing armed struggle for an independent state or autonomy in Turkey’s southeast by
ethnic Kurds was echoed by Ali, who highlighted that Somaliland’s
intellectuals and government both understand Turkey’s government
links the issue of Somaliland’s independence with Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. “This is why Turkey is antagonistic toward Somaliland’s
independence,” Ali explained. “[Turkish leaders think] If we show
sympathy for Somaliland’s independence, then this will be picked up
on by [Turkey’s] Kurds and used against the [Turkish] state.”
Even as Somaliland and Somalia held talks circa 2012 to 2016, as
described below, the policies and actions of Turkey and other external
states operating in Somalia continued to support “One Somalia.”20 This
brazenly ignored on-the-ground realities, such as Somaliland’s strong
legal case for independent statehood and recognition; its decades of
sovereignty as well as its history; and lastly, the fact Somalia’s FGS
does not hold a monopoly on the use of force—legitimate or illegitimate—in Mogadishu, let alone in regions outside the capital.21 In other
words, the FGS is legitimate in the eyes of the international community, but illegitimate in much of the country it claims to govern. How
then does the international support for “One Somalia” make sense?
Elmi vented his frustrations: “Honestly, I don’t know what the international community wants as a whole. There is not one [Somali] nation.
The reality is very different. Demanding ‘One Somalia’ over and over
again will not lead to a settlement.”
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Despite its firm stance against recognizing Somaliland’s independence, has Turkey’s involvement in Somalia led to any positive
spinoffs in Somaliland? When the interviewees were asked about Turkey in Somaliland, they only mentioned education and medical care,
both occurring in Turkey. Ali, for instance, highlighted that Turkey
now accepts Somaliland higher education, primary and secondary
school certificates without condition. He added, however, Turkey continues to deny visas to Somaliland passport holders with the exception
of Somaliland government officials. As such, Somalilanders who wish
to study in Turkey must travel to Mogadishu to procure a Republic of
Somalia passport. Only then will their Turkish visa be issued. Giving
voice to the frustration many Somalilanders feel about Turkey’s inaction in their own country, Goth boldly states, “I didn’t see any [positive
actions taken by Turkey in Somaliland]. There have been no development projects, not even humanitarian assistance.”
IV. Turkey’s Role in Somaliland-Somalia Talks
The first talks aimed at addressing the political chasm between
Somaliland and Somalia began in London in 2012, 20 years after the
break-up of the Somali Union. Prior to the London talks, Somaliland’s
leaders had adopted a strict policy of non-negotiation with Somalia.
This was instituted for three main reasons.22 First, the Somali regions
to Somaliland’s south lacked a functioning government with which to
negotiate given the ongoing civil wars. Second, when a series of transitional and then federal governments were created, they continued to
ignore Somaliland’s independence, instead claiming it had violently
seceded. Third, Somalia’s successive governments have all refused to
acknowledge the atrocities committed in Somaliland by the Somali
armed forces in 1988.23
After London and a brief turn in Dubai, Turkey’s turn to host talks
came in 2013 and 2014, with negotiations held in Istanbul as well as
president-level talks in Ankara. Talks planned for 2015 in Istanbul fell
through and were followed, in 2016, by a final round of talks between
intellectuals in Ankara.24 The talks hosted in Turkey did yield some
ephemeral successes. Agreements were signed, for instance, by government officials from both states related to their sharing of humanitarian aid, the controlling and monitoring of joint air space, cooperating
in the security sector, and combating illegal fishing.
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Somalilanders left Turkey with promissory notes. They were already
frustrated with the negotiation process, in general, seeing it as a venue
for international grandstanding by host states rather than a useful
platform for resolving long-standing issues and grievances. More specifically, the refusal of Somali officials to sit in the same room rankled
Somalilanders, and again underscored Mogadishu’s refusal to recognize Somaliland’s independent status. Nevertheless, FGS officials were
in Turkey, signing agreements with government officials from Somaliland. This, in and of itself, was indicative of a grudging acceptance of
Somaliland’s status by both the FGS and the talks’ hosts, Turkey. That
the results of the talks proved costly to Somaliland was what really
turned Somalilanders against Turkey.
Somalilanders have a history of checkered deal making with their
southern cousins. Perhaps because of this, they were not completely
surprised when the agreements signed publicly and officially in Turkey were neither honored nor fulfilled by Somalia. Indeed, every point
agreed to in Turkey was rejected or never enacted by FGS President
Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmajo, soon after he
took office in 2017. In 2018, for example, the FGS abrogated the previous agreement it made with Somaliland that allowed direct international assistance to Somaliland instead of through Mogadishu. When
Mogadishu assumed airspace control from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2019, it was a complete rejection of its
shared airspace plan with Hargeisa.25 According to one report, “This
move reversed a previously negotiated plan that would have established a joint regulatory body in Somaliland’s capital, with Hargeisa
and Mogadishu sharing the revenues accruing from overflights.”26
The perfidy of Mogadishu’s political elites was on full display for
Edna Adan Ismail, current Presidential Envoy of the Republic of Somaliland, former Foreign Minister and founder of the Edna Adan Hospital
and Edna Adan University. Adan highlighted that not only did Somalia assume control, but “[President] Farmajo’s rejection of the airspace
agreement has jeopardized Somaliland’s airspace and airports. Farmajo
has forbidden the ICAO to provide technical support to Somaliland.
This is criminal and endangers air safety and aircraft… [Hargeisa Airport] is an airport with medical evacuations as well as civilian and commercial aircraft. Airport operations should be well-coordinated, and the
airport should be well-serviced in order to assure safety.”
129

Bildhaan  Vol. 21

The retraction of agreements signed in Turkey—and Ankara’s subsequent silence—were viewed as ominous signs in Hargeisa. Turkey had
clearly sided with Mogadishu, from Hargeisa’s perspective, and thus
could no longer be considered a neutral host for any future Somaliland-Somalia talks. Speaking in a private capacity, Dr. Osman Sheikh
Ahmed, Economic Advisor to the current Somaliland Government,
believes that Turkey should only be included in future negotiations
alongside other major states.27 “We know where Turkey stands [on the
issue of Somaliland-Somalia] so we cannot trust them completely.”
Osman also pointed out that negotiations—unless they involve the
topic of mutual divorce or new relationship agreement—are now
moot. He opined that Somaliland had moved ahead in its governance
and democratic processes as evidenced by the parliamentary and local
election held in May 2021.28 Somalia, on the other hand remains mired
in conflict, instability and an absence of a democratic process. “The
international community is not likely to push for negotiations as they
did before,” added Osman, “and Turkey must realize the facts on the
ground, its heavy investment in Somalia notwithstanding.”
V. Flying the Flag in Hargeisa
Turkey took a step many other external states have not: it opened a
consulate in Hargeisa in 2014. Unlike its Ethiopian and Djiboutian
counterparts which maintain a discreet presence, Turkey’s consulate is
official and flies the Turkish flag. Yet Ethiopia’s and Djibouti’s low-key
presence belies the fact that their offices act as de facto embassies, not
satellite locations of their embassies in Mogadishu. Turkey’s consular
presence in Hargeisa has, therefore, done little to improve its image.
When queried about Turkey’s consular presence in Somaliland,
most interviewees saw it in a negatively nuanced light. For Goth, the
consulate issues visas to Somalilanders who require medical treatment
and students who wish to study in Turkey. Osman opined that he
was not even sure if the Turkish consulate directly issues visas at all,
perhaps indicating that Turkey uses its consulate as a vector for “One
Somalia.” Elmi saw a more sinister motive: “I suspect that maybe their
role [at the Turkish consulate] is to gather intelligence and give their
relations [with Somaliland] a veneer of respectability.” Ali also saw
Turkey’s consulate in Hargeisa in a negative political light. “Mostly
we [Somalilanders] see the consulate is serving as an actor pushing
130

Brendon J. Cannon

an integrationist agenda for Somalia-Somaliland. It facilitates these
activities.” Ali added that Turkish consular officials have attempted
to normalize travel between Somaliland and Somalia, preferring, for
example, to issue Turkish visas from their embassy in Mogadishu
rather than the consulate in Hargeisa. In this, Ali argued, Turkey was
conducting “business that is contrary to the well-being of Somaliland.
They are doing what is in the interest of Turkey, and that is the unification of Somalia-Somaliland.” He added that Turkish officials were
isolated in Hargeisa as there was no political engagement by Somaliland government officials. Ali contrasted this with British officials who
frequently liaised with their Somaliland counterparts or visited universities or other public venues to offer speeches or participate in discussions.
VI. Training an Army, Militarizing a Conflict
Turkey’s inaction in Somaliland contrasts sharply with its highly visible role in Mogadishu, which Ankara has made a veritable beehive
of activity. And it is Turkey’s military and security support for Somalia that elicited the strongest language from Somalilanders. Their ire
was specifically directed against what they see as an existential threat
posed by Turkey’s military presence in Mogadishu and its training of
the SNA. Certainly, Somaliland’s precarious political position coupled
with its historical trauma mean that the specter of a well-trained and
equipped SNA is horrific for Somalilanders to contemplate. It signals,
for many, the possibility of a violent, forced return to an unwanted
union; a union that sidelined Somaliland for decades and eventually
attempted to erase it. Yet, how does Turkey’s military training facility
contribute to such doomsday predictions?
Turkey opened its TURKSOM military training facility (Somali:
Xerada TURKSOM; Turkish: Somali Türk Görev Kuvveti Komutanlığı) in
2017, with the stated goal of training and preparing the officers and
NCOs of the SNA. By October 2020, Turkish military trainers had performed so well that they were training the sixth group of SNA infantry,
totaling 450 soldiers, and providing them with basic military training,
Anti-Terrorism Training and Exercise Center Command.29 They were
part of a 5,000-strong battalion that Turkey hopes to train in order to
bring total SNA troop numbers closer to the 15,000-16,000 promised in
2017.30
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Troops coming out of TURKSOM now form the “backbone” of the
SNA and are among the best-trained and capable of troops, particularly the Special Operations Command Battalion known as the Cheetah Unit (Somali: Ciidanka Haramcad) and the Eagles (Somali: Gorgor).
Turkey’s training mission of the SNA is meant to provide the FGS with
a professional, cohesive and truly national military force—including
the country’s coastguard and navy—that can claw back the state’s
monopoly on violence throughout the length and breadth of what the
FGS considers to be Somalia. The mission’s success or failure are a
critical factor in Somalia’s current security environment: the country
has not possessed a viable military force since its breakup in 1991. In
fact, the FGS continues to rely on foreign-backed security forces, particularly those functioning under the UN-approved and AU-operated
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) mandate. This not only
means that soldiers from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and other African
states prosecute armed action in Somalia against the al-Shabaab terrorist group, but also provide security for critical facilities such as Mogadishu’s international airport and airport zone, home to a plethora of
UN offices, foreign contractors and embassies. AMISOM troops, for
example, are called on when security breaks down in Mogadishu, as it
frequently does. Yet, SNA soldiers—trained and equipped by Turkey—
are increasingly called upon to take the fight to al-Shabaab and assume
many of the roles and functions of AMISOM troops. Indeed, the major
impetus for Turkey’s training efforts come directly from AMISOM’s
imminent end of mission and, thus, their departure from Somalia.31
There is increasing evidence of a more insidious angle to the activities of an increasingly powerful and capable SNA. The Cheetah Unit
and Eagles have reportedly begun to perform operations informed by
the politics of clannism, a particularly combustible prospect in Somalia.32 Yet al-Shabaab—the destruction of which is the primary motivator
driving the training efforts of external states and international organizations—remains in control of large swathes of territory in southern
and western Somalia despite over a decade of AMISOM operations
and US drones strikes.33 The sum of these developments, involving
a capable and increasingly politicized SNA, but one that appears to
ignore the threat of al-Shabaab, are viewed with deep suspicion and
concern in Somaliland, and may become increasingly problematic for
Turkey. Despite its best efforts to remain above the fray of Somalia’s
squabbles, often informed by Byzantine clan and sub-clan politics,
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Turkey’s role in training effective fighting units is fraught. “There is
little doubt that one of the pitfalls of [Turkey] training the SNA means
that Turkey may get pulled by Somali politicians in directions it wishes
to avoid. These include clan favoritism, regionalism, factionalism and,
above all issues involving territorial integrity. Turkey may find this
increasingly hard to avoid as the SNA, and therefore Somalia, become
increasingly reliant on Turkey for the expertise, skillsets and matériel
required to maintain the SNA.”34 Should Turkey get sucked into this
maelstrom, it may find itself accused of being in collusion with the
SNA in violent actions taking place across Somalia.
Despite drawbacks, Somalia’s rulers have access to steady security
sector assistance from external patrons. Somaliland, in contrast, has
no benefactor like Turkey willing to train and equip its armed forces.
While some police and coast guard training has occurred under the
auspices of the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU),
respectively, the UN arms embargo leveled against Somalia in 1992
is still in place.35 Despite making do with very little, Somalilanders
can see the proverbial writing on the wall vis-à-vis Turkish-trained
SNA troops supplied with weaponry, including armored vehicles and
assault rifles.36 After all, they followed the successes of Turkish-armed
proxy forces in Libya and the Caucasus with an interest bordering
on dread, taking stock of the incredible firepower and effectiveness
of Turkish-made armed drones. Somalilanders are also aware of the
increasingly large sales of Turkish-made weapons to other states in
sub-Saharan Africa, but not to Somaliland.37 It is little wonder, then,
that many see the Turkish-trained and armed SNA as an existential
threat to Somaliland. Elmi, for instance, asked, “What would stop Turkey from giving drones to [Somali President] Farmajo, eventually tipping the balance [of power]? Somaliland does not have an air force; it
has no new military equipment. We are isolated…” Seconding Elmi,
Ali noted the skepticism many Somalilanders have about the motives
of both Turkey and Somalia. He opined,
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“Turkey wants to show their military presence in the strategic Horn
of Africa region. Somalia wants the SNA trained [by Turkey] to get
military armaments [supplied by Turkey]. Because of the [UN arms]
embargo, Turkey can use the training as cover to bring equipment and
arms to Somalia. Under the cover of training, Turkey brings this [military] hardware to Somalia… If Somalia builds its military capacity,
they will try and invade Somaliland, which they believe is part and
parcel of Somalia.”
For Goth, who remembered the carnage wrought by the SNA in
Somaliland in 1988, it was simply a matter of time before Somalia
attempted to forcibly bring Somaliland back to the union.
If you look at how [Turkey is] building Somalia’s military capabilities… and how [President] Farmajo is using them [Turkish-trained troops] in Gedo and Galmadug, and to destabilize
Jubaland to empower his own political loyalists, Somaliland
watches and is worried.38 We see it as a driver of what Somalia
may do to Somaliland. Imagine if Turkey gives Farmajo drones
and military helicopters. This is a threat to us. We are getting
neither military training nor assistance from the outside world…
When the day comes and Somalia resolves its issues [of chronic
instability], they will attack Somaliland.
It was Adan’s response to questions about Turkey’s role in training the
SNA that best demonstrated the burning anger some Somalilanders
reserve for Turkey and its arming and training of the SNA. Her words
deserve to be printed verbatim:
We [Somaliland] are the enemy that the SNA is being trained for.
We are to be defeated… We are the target, the supposed enemy.
And once Somalia thinks it has the capability to launch an attack
from Somalia, it will do so, as it did many times between 19821990. The real problem for Somalia seems to be that we [Somalilanders] forgot to die when they [Somalia’s army] left us to die [in
1988]. Instead, we have recovered, we have businesses, we have
democracy. We are alive and refuse to die and that seems to be
too much for Somalia. Rather than [Somalia] rebuilding themselves and bringing their refugees home, they are only focused on
destroying the peace and stability Somaliland has secured. Our
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blood will be on the hands of those who armed the criminals and
allowed this to happen.
VII. Turkey’s Rejoinder
Somalia has a political significance for Turkey, one that pays dividends, albeit minor, at the ballot box. That is, after a mere decade of
building infrastructure, providing humanitarian aid and offering education to thousands of Somalis in Turkey, Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and
Development party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)—increasingly
under siege at home and abroad—can point to a veritable success story
in Somalia, replete with all the trappings of Erdoğan’s “Ankara consensus.”39 This Turkish triumph, nevertheless, largely ignores areas
outside the purview of the FGS, which limits its impact and efficacy
across most of the former Somali Republic. For Somaliland, Turkey has
been an absent partner or unwanted meddler, at best. At worst, it is
actively colluding with Somalia to erase Somaliland. What is Turkey’s
response?
When contacted for an interview, Turkish official sources confirmed
that Turkey recognizes Somalia’s FGS as the only legitimate government and, in line with other states and international organizations,
does not recognize Somaliland’s independence. Nevertheless, Turkish
official sources noted the important role Turkey plays in Somaliland,
pointing to Ankara’s building-up of a dialogue mechanism to facilitate
Somalia-Somaliland talks. In this, Turkey is ready and willing to “continue our contribution… should both parties wish so.” They added, “In
all of our endeavors, we have been working closely with both sides,
and [have] received [the] greenlight to continue our engagements.”
The source of the “green light” was not written, but one could be safe
in assuming it came from Mogadishu and not Hargeisa, given the disappointments of Somalilanders over the previous talks’ outcomes, as
described above.
Turkish official sources, contrary to information provided by
Somalilander interviewees, highlighted Turkey provision of humanitarian and development assistance to Somaliland since 2013. When
queried about the specifics of their work, they listed the over 120
scholarships offered to Somaliland students between 2018-2019, the
humanitarian aid provided by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency
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Management Authority (AFAD) to Somalilanders affected by Cyclone
Sagar in 2018, and the donation of $100,000 worth of medical equipment to the Hargeisa Group Hospital in January 2019 by the Turkish
Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), among others. Turkish official sources also pointed to training performed by the Turkish
Immigration Department for six Somaliland Immigration and Border Control Department officials in November 2018.40 These efforts
form part of what Turkish official sources call “in kind” assistance to
Somaliland given that Turkey does not provide any direct financial
support to the de facto independent country.
When asked about the Hargeisa consulate’s functional role, Turkish
official sources noted it “mainly deals with the issues of our citizens in
its mission area.” This is certainly a function of consulates around the
world, but they often provide outreach and visa services, too. Turkey’s
consular presence in Hargeisa is thus understandably mystifying to
Somalilanders, and the answers of Turkish official sources largely confirmed that its consulate does not issue visas in Hargeisa.
In terms of its training of the SNA, it is worth underscoring that
Turkey is not acting alone in Somalia in this capacity. There are a host
of state and non-state actors doing the same, albeit on a smaller scale.41
As such, should Turkey discontinue its training mission there is little
doubt that another set of actors would partially fill the void. Turkey is
certainly on sound legal footing vis-à-vis its military training efforts—
they are in Somalia based on legal agreements with the FGS—and Turkey actively and directly contributes to the destruction of al-Shabaab.
Turkish official sources also highlighted that their military training
and equipment are not intended for a specific political actor or time
period. Instead, as the political leaders of a sovereign state, the FGS is
responsible for how and when it uses Somali security forces. Turkish
official sources were adamant that Turkey played no part in the SNA’s
chain of command. Indeed, when questioned as to whether certain
FGS-ordered operations by the SNA would make Turkey reconsider its
training mission, they responded: “There is no need to speculate on a
non-existent/hypothetical scenario.”
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VIII. Conclusion
Turkey’s popularity in Somalia remains mostly undimmed.42 While
opposition candidates in Mogadishu have decried Turkey’s supply of
weaponry and the actions of Turkish-trained army units, there is little
doubt that they would utilize such resources to affect outcomes in their
favor should they become the next denizens of Villa Somalia.43 In other
words, the tactile nature of Turkey’s engagement of Somalia—building
roads, training soldiers, contributing to the government’s budget—are
favored by Somalia’s “lumpen elite” as a way of making Somalia great
again, a country that was once one of Africa’s most successful states
with a powerful and well-regarded military and bureaucracy.
There is little doubt that Turkey is a useful and increasingly important external state partner for Somalia’s government. Despite the rosy
glow suffusing Turkey’s efforts, however, Somalia remains deeply
fragmented, a shadow of its former self. Turkey’s policies are sound for
functioning states, where money and support are provided to the central government which then distributes them to the periphery based
on political, economic or strategic needs. The FGS is not a fully sovereign government, however, and maintains difficult relations with
multiple member states. For these reasons, stacking more power in the
hands of Mogadishu’s political elites is unlikely to significantly heal
these fractures. Rather, a more likely scenario is one involving extreme
violence engendered by the security environment, one that is characterized by “personalized or neopatrimonial relationships and interagency rivalries conducted amongst and between political elites and
security actors such as police, militaries, intelligence agencies, special
units, warlords, militia and commercial security companies.”44 Turkey’s efforts, despite their worthiness, are potentially lighting another
fuse that leads to a steadily growing and combustible heap of clan and
regional rivalries, historical grievances and a nihilism brought on by
three decades of violence, corruption and misgovernment, and the
concomitant frustration and exhaustion associated therewith.
Somalilanders are cognizant of the top-down approach being taken
in Mogadishu by the FGS’s external state patron, Turkey. Faisal Ali
Warabe,45 Chairman of the For Justice and Development (UCID) political party, scoffed, “Somalia does not need a strong navy. They haven’t
yet reconciled their own internal problems. There’s not even a united
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Italian Somalia yet. The whole concept and approach [by Turkey], is
really not going to benefit anyone in Somalia. What is Turkey doing? It
is putting the cart before the horse.” Despite the grim forecasts, some
welcomed greater Turkish political and security assistance in Somaliland despite the vitriol they directed at Turkey for its role in empowering Somalia at the possible expense of Somaliland’s independence and
sovereignty. Elmi admitted Somaliland’s poverty and added that international assistance, from Turkey or others, is welcome. Warabe wished
to see security sector assistance from Turkey. “We need to rebuild our
military force, our naval force, our air force. We have a coast guard,
but our coastline is huge. We need a navy, not a coast guard.” In other
words, parity in Turkish security assistance to Somaliland and Somalia
was desired, not one-sided actions in favor of Mogadishu. Adan concurred, arguing for “friendly relations, a partnership, collaboration as
friends. Not just band aids.”
The concerns expressed by Somalilanders toward Turkey could
be dispelled if Ankara chose to engage more with the other federal
member states and regions of Somalia. The disparity between Turkey’s
actions in Somalia, where it has invested millions and bilateral trade
topped $250 million in 2019, and Somaliland is stark. Somalilanders
view Turkey’s motives suspiciously given this disparity. The one-sided
nature of Ankara’s engagement simply cannot be denied. Turkish aid
organizations have set a small precedent in Somaliland by their presence, but official Turkish government support and funding remain tied
up in Mogadishu.
Somaliland, despite its strategic geography, successful democratic
experience and secure environment has not risen to the level of a strategic partner, one that other internationally recognized states would
stick their necks out for. In truth, Turkey would benefit little from
its recognition of Somaliland’s independence. Turkish entities would
likely be ejected from Somalia with a blanket ban like the one leveled
against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after Dubai’s DP World, a
mega ports operator, refused to stop work on Somaliland’s Berbera
port. Turkish companies would likely forfeit their lucrative contracts
at the port and airport, and Turkey’s training facility in Mogadishu
would likely be shuttered. It is surely Turkey’s ongoing, custodial role
of these Somali infrastructure assets—its port and airport operations,
its training camp and its direct funding of the FGS—that give Ankara
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the power to pressure Somalia’s political elites should it choose to do
so. To pretend Ankara does not have leverage over the FGS is a strawman argument. Yet, Turkish official sources bristled at the suggestion
of using “pressure” on the FGS, noting that “Turkey’s role as a facilitator does not envisage putting pressure on either party.”
Turkey has the latitude of movement to shift its one-sided relationship with Somalia to a more balanced one with Somaliland. Neither
the impetus nor the rationale for such a move is yet there. This may
change, however, according to the inimitable Edna Adan. “Somalia has
a habit of never thanking those who help her… I don’t know how long
that friendship can continue.” For Adan and the other Somalilanders
interviewed, Somaliland’s position vis-à-vis Somalia and Turkey is
clear: “We would rather remain unrecognized and stable as we have
been for the past 30 years, than be recognized and become a complete
mess like Somalia. We’ve conquered our obstacles. We’re closer than
the moon is and certainly closer than Mars, the world is welcome to
come and visit and try Somaliland.”
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